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Using Cognitive Agents to Train
Negotiation Skills
Christopher A. Stevens*†, Jeroen Daamen, Emma Gaudrain, Tom Renkema,
Jakob Dirk Top, Fokie Cnossen and Niels A. Taatgen
Faculty of Science and Engineering, Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Engineering, University of Groningen, Groningen,
Netherlands
Training negotiation is difficult because it is a complex, dynamic activity that involves
multiple parties. It is often not clear how to create situations in which students can
practice negotiation or how tomeasure students’ progress. Some have begun to address
these issues by creating artificial software agents with which students can train. These
agents have the advantage that they can be “reset,” and played against multiple times.
This allows students to learn from their mistakes and try different strategies. However,
these agents are often based on normative theories of how negotiators should conduct
themselves, not necessarily how people actually behave in negotiations. Here, we take
a step toward addressing this gap by developing an agent grounded in a cognitive
architecture, ACT-R. This agent contains a model of theory-of-mind, the ability of humans
to reason about the mental states of others. It uses this model to try to infer the strategy
of the opponent and respond accordingly. In a series of experiments, we show that this
agent replicates some aspects of human performance, is plausible to human negotiators,
and can lead to learning gains in a small-scale negotiation task.
Keywords: theory-of-mind, negotiation, cognitive modeling, strategic games, training
INTRODUCTION
Negotiation is an important tool through which people work with others to better satisfy their
needs. Negotiation is ubiquitous, and its contexts range from mundane daily occurrences (e.g.,
deciding how to split the check for dinner) to historic, far-reaching events (e.g., international
conflict resolutions). For this reason, it is important for people to know how to effectively approach
negotiations in order to achieve fair, mutually beneficial agreements. However, training negotiation
is challenging because it is a complex activity that involves at least two parties. So people must
practice either in groups or with simulated partners. Cognitive agents are a promising tool for
developing such agents because they can simulate human memory, biases, and problem solving
strategies, allowing students to get a better sense of how real negotiators will respond to various
circumstances. Here we develop and validate a cognitive agent that can perform a single-issue
bargaining task.
Cognitive Agents as Training Partners
Prior work shows that cognitive agents can make realistic opponents and training partners in
multi-person tasks. These agents provide a good account of behavior in a variety of multiplayer
strategic games including the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Gonzalez et al., 2014), Rock-Paper-Scissors
(West et al., 2005), and even Backgammon (Sanner et al., 2000). Moreover, in complex cooperative
tasks such as UAVpiloting, teams with a cognitive agent can perform just as well as all-human teams
(Ball et al., 2009). However, there is a dearth of research on the effect of these agents on learning.We
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aimed to address this gap in the current work by demonstrating
the utility of a cognitive agent for negotiation training.
Theory of Mind in Negotiation
Prior research suggests that theory of mind, the ability to reason
about the beliefs and intentions of others, may play an important
role in negotiation (Hindriks and Tykhonov, 2008; de Weerd
et al., 2013, 2015a). People don’t always use theory of mind when
it is to their advantage (Hedden and Zhang, 2002), but training
with software agents that have theory-of-mind capabilities can
improve theory-of-mind utilization in human users (de Weerd
et al., 2015a). In the present paper, we develop a prototype
cognitive model with theory-of-mind capabilities to serve as a
training partner for humans learning to negotiate.
Fisher and Ury (1981), admonish negotiators to focus on
interests, not positions. In other words, a skillful negotiator bases
decisions on his/her own goals and the goals of the opponent(s).
Unfortunately, in negotiations the true goals of the opponent
are often unclear. Making inferences about these unknown goals
requires theory of mind (Premack and Woodruff, 1978), the
ability to reason about the mental states of oneself and others.
Theory of mind provides an important advantage in a variety
of settings. Agents that possess theory of mind often outperform
their opponents in competitive settings (Hindriks and Tykhonov,
2008; de Weerd et al., 2014), and achieve better outcomes
for themselves and their teammates in cooperative and mixed-
motive situations, including negotiation games (de Weerd et al.,
2013; Stevens et al., 2016). In a mixed-motive situation, the goals
of the players partially overlap, making theory of mind especially
helpful in identifying areas of common interest (de Weerd et al.,
2015b). Unfortunately, there is compelling evidence that people
often do not use theory ofmindwhen it is useful to do so (Hedden
and Zhang, 2002; Wright and Leyton-Brown, 2010; Camerer
et al., 2015).
It remains an open question how best to train theory of mind
in negotiators. Training with software agents appears to be a
promising option. de Weerd et al. (2015b) show that people
do show evidence of adopting theory of mind after negotiating
with an agent with theory of mind. Unfortunately, people often
behave differently when dealing with agents than when dealing
with people (Kiesler et al., 1996; Lin et al., 2014), making it
possible that people will be reluctant to ascribe mental states to
agents. Thus, an ideal software agent is one that makes decisions
in a realistic and plausible way. In the present study we create
such an agent by utilizing Instance-Based Learning (Logan, 1988;
Gonzalez and Lebiere, 2005), a theory that has been successful
in modeling human decision-making in a variety of contexts,
including the prisoner’s dilemma (Lebiere et al., 2000; Gonzalez
et al., 2014; Stevens et al., 2016), backgammon (Sanner et al.,
2000), and the lemonade game (Reitter et al., 2010).
Cooperative and Competitive Goals in
Negotiation
A key challenge in negotiation is balancing cooperation and
competition. Negotiators must work together to create valuable
agreements, but they must also claim some of the created value
for themselves (a.k.a. “The Negotiator’s Dilemma”; Lax and
Sebenius, 1986). Almost all negotiations are mixed-motive in the
sense that failing to reach an agreement yields no benefit. So the
goals of the other party must (at least to a degree) be satisfied.
However, people may differ in the relative weights they assign
to their own goals and to the goals of others (De Dreu et al.,
2000). Competitive players have a low concern for the outcomes
of others while cooperative players have a high concern.
Depending on intentions, negotiators will use different
types of strategies (Allen et al., 1990; Huffmeier et al., 2014).
Cooperative strategies aim to maximize the probability of an
agreement and the satisfaction of all parties involved, and thus
are very appropriate if one’s goal is to cooperate. These strategies
are characterized by moderate opening bids, high reciprocity,
willingness to make unilateral concessions, honesty, and open
sharing of information (Yukl, 1974; Esser and Komorita, 1975;
Komorita and Esser, 1975; Allen et al., 1990; Paese and Gilin,
2000; Huffmeier et al., 2014). The philosophy behind these
strategies is summarized by Osgood’s Graduated Reciprocation
in Tension (GRIT) Theory (Osgood, 1962). According to this
theory, offering an opponent a concession can reduce the tension
felt by the other party, increasing the probability of a concession
in return.
Aggressive strategies, by contrast, are intended to maximize
one’s own gains without regard to the gains of the other
negotiator(s). In some cases, those using aggressive tactics may
actually want their counterpart to receive as little value as
possible from the deal (Aksoy and Weesie, 2012). Aggressive
strategies are characterized by high opening bids, low reciprocity,
unwillingness to make unilateral concessions, deception, and
application of time pressure (Siegel and Fouraker, 1960;
Chertkoff and Baird, 1971; Esser and Komorita, 1975; Smith et al.,
1982; Allen et al., 1990; Huffmeier et al., 2014). These strategies
are based on aspiration theory (Siegel and Fouraker, 1960).
Openly aggressive moves communicate to the opponent that the
bargainer’s goal is to maximize his or her own payout. According
to aspiration theory, when a negotiator has high aspirations,
the opposing negotiator will tend to lower his/her aspirations
in response. Aspiration theory prescribes that bargainers always
show strength in negotiations, as that will weaken the aspiration
levels of the opponent. Aggressive negotiators might also engage
in deception in order to hide their aggression and exploit the trust
of a counterpart (Chertkoff and Baird, 1971). This deception can
include lying about reserve prices, alternative offers, the value of
an item for sale (in the case of a buyer-seller negotiation), etc.
Knowing the intentions of the opponent can provide an
important advantage by allowing the player to adapt their own
strategy accordingly. In mixed-motive contexts, the best way to
adapt is often to become as cooperative (or aggressive) as the
opponent, a meta-strategy known as matching (Liebert et al.,
1960; Druckman et al., 1972; Yukl, 1974; Chertkoff and Esser,
1976; Smith et al., 1982; Faratin et al., 1997; Maaravi et al.,
2014). This type of meta-strategy is commonly observed in
social interaction games, such as the ultimatum game (Falk
et al., 2003; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) and the prisoner’s
dilemma (Kelley and Stahelski, 1970; Stevens et al., 2016). It has
also been observed in negotiation experiments, especially when
participants have more information about their counterparts’
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payoff schemes and alternatives (Liebert et al., 1960; Smith et al.,
1982; Weingart et al., 2007; Schei et al., 2011). This meta-
strategy is reminiscent of the tit-for-tat strategy in the prisoner’s
dilemma (Axelrod, 1980; Lax and Sebenius, 1986). A matching
meta-strategy rewards cooperative behavior by an opponent and
punishes aggressive behavior. Previous work has shown that
negotiators will sometimes employ a matching meta-strategy.
However, the lack of time and information in many negotiation
contexts makes this difficult (Liebert et al., 1960; Chertkoff and
Esser, 1976; Smith et al., 1982).
The Game of Nines
The focus of the present work is on single-issue, distributive
negotiation: two parties negotiating to determine how to divide
a fixed amount of value. Our experimental task is the Game of
Nines, a negotiation task first used by Kelley et al. (1967) to study
negotiation behaviors in human participants. In this game, two
players are given 9 points that must be split between them. In
addition, each player has aminimum value that theymust acquire
in order to avoid losing points (Minimum Necessary Share, or
MNS). When a player receives points, their MNS is subtracted
from these points to determine their profit or loss. For instance,
if a player’s MNS is 2, and they receive 3 points, their profit for
the round is 1. Each player knows only their ownMNS value, but
not their opponent’s. If the players cannot reach an agreement,
neither player gets any points. The game is played over a series
of rounds, each requiring the players to divide nine points. The
structure of the negotiations is often open-ended, allowing the
players to discuss potential deals as they wish.
Like many real-world negotiations, the Game of Nines is a
mixed-motive situation. Players are motivated to work for the
interests of the group but they also have interests that conflict
with those of the group. Both players have a clear incentive to
reach an agreement because that is the only way to obtain points.
However, players are also motivated to receive as many points as
possible out of every deal. Increasing one’s own points can only
be done at the expense of the other player.
OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS
Our goal in this paper is to produce a cognitively plausible
negotiation training agent. We conducted three experiments to
this end. In Experiment 1, we observed how people negotiate
with two non-cognitive agents. We then used this data to build
a cognitively plausible agent that can play the Game of Nines.
We verified the plausibility of this agent by pitting it against non-
cognitive agents in the Game of Nines. In Experiment 2, the
model played against human players so that we could determine
its effectiveness and believability. In Experiment 3, we used
the model to train human participants in the Game of Nines.
Experiment 1 showed that the model negotiates in a similar way
as humans in this task. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that the
model is a competent, believable negotiation partner and that
people who play against it show improvement in the Game of
Nines.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, human participants played the Game of
Nines against two pre-programmed, non-cognitive agents. The
two artificial agents used different strategies; one was more
cooperative, while the other was more aggressive. To perform
well in the task, players should adapt their strategies to counter
those of their opponent. We then examined the strategies and
performance of the human players and used this data to construct
a metacognitive model capable of identifying and adapting to
these strategies. Finally, we allowed our metacognitive model to
play against the non-cognitive agents to determine whether it
demonstrated human-like performance.
Participants
Twenty-one people (8 male, ageM = 21.8 SD= 2.1) participated
in this experiment in exchange for 10 euros. This group consisted
mainly of international students at the University of Groningen.
All were recruited using ads posted on social media.
Procedure
Participants in all three experiments completed the experimental
task in a small laboratory equipped with 3 cubicles, each
containing aMacbook Pro laptop computer. Each participant was
seated in one of the three cubicles. Participants in Experiments
1 and 3 interacted with software agents loaded onto their
respective laptops. Participants in Experiment 2 interacted with
the experimenter and a confederate through a local wireless
network connecting the laptops in the cubicles.
We used two non-cognitive agents as opponents in this
task. One opponent, the “fair” agent, was designed to play
cooperatively and always attempt to achieve an even split. The
other opponent, the “unfair” agent, was programmed to play
aggressively and try to obtain a larger share of the points for itself.
All participants played against both agents in alternating order.
Half of the participants played against the fair agent first and
the other half played against the unfair agent first. Participants
played for 3 blocks of 24 trials per block. For half of each block,
participants played against one of the agents, and then for the
second half they played the other agent (order was randomly
determined for each participant but consistent across the three
blocks). There was a brief rest period between blocks. Each agent
had a different name (“Tom” and “Ben”) and a different line-
drawing for their portrait. The players were not informed about
the nature of the strategies used by the agents or even that there
was a difference in their strategies. The names and portraits were
selected so neither would provide any clues about the nature of
the agent and that each agent had the same “gender.” This was
intended to prevent the participants from behaving differently
toward the agents on account of gender biases.
Participants interacted with the agent through a GUI run
in Python 3.3 using the TkInter library (see Figure 1). At the
beginning of every trial, both the player and the agent were shown
their own MNS values. The following pairs of MNS values were
used: (2,2) (1,3) (3,1) (2,2) (3,3) (2,3) (3,2) (3,4) (4,3) (2,4) (4,2)
(4,4). For all of these pairs, it is possible to find at least one
solution in which neither party loses points, and in all but one
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FIGURE 1 | The user interface for the Game of Nines experiment.
case (4,4), it is possible for both parties to gain points. The order
of these pairs was randomized for each participant and for each
block. After the agent and player saw their MNS values, they were
required to declare their MNS values. These declared values were
visible to both the player and the agent and did not have to be
true. Both the agent and the player could display dishonest MNS
values. Each player knew only their own MNS value and their
opponent’s declared MNS value. Then, the player was asked to
make an offer to the agent. This offer indicated how many points
the player wanted for himself or herself. Any number from 1 to 9
could be selected. The player also had the option to indicate that
this was his or her final offer. This indicated to the agent that the
player would not make any lower offers. Finally, the player could
quit the negotiation instead of making an offer. After the player
made an offer, the agent would accept it, propose a counter offer,
or quit. This process continued until an agreement was reached
or one player quit. At the end of the trial, the player was notified
of the outcome of the trial and the player’s cumulative number of
points for the block was displayed. The player was not informed
about how many points the agent had scored.
Non-cognitive Agents
The non-cognitive agents negotiate based on simple algorithms
and are not based on models of human reasoning or memory.
These models also do not possess theory of mind capability. The
non-cognitive agents were designed to play either cooperatively
or aggressively. However, they each respond better to a different
type of negotiation strategy. To perform well in this task, a player
cannot simply use the same strategy against both agents. The
player needs to detect the strategy used by the agent and adjust
his or her own strategy accordingly.
Fair Agent
The fair agent uses a simple cooperative strategy. The agent
determines the most fair point split based on its own MNS value
and the assumed MNS value of the opponent. It then makes bids
that are the same distance away from this split as the opponent’s
actual bid. However, if the agent detects a discrepancy between
the player’s average MNS claims and its own average MNS values,
it becomes less generous. The larger the difference between the
agent’s mean MNS and the average reported MNS of the player,
the fewer points the model will agree to grant to the player. See
Appendix B in Supplementary Material for more detail on the
implementation of the agents.
The ideal strategy against this agent is honest cooperation.
If the player always honestly informs the fair agent about its
MNS value then the agent will agree to split the available points.
However, lying is very costly, as it will cause the agent to become
demanding very quickly.
Unfair Agent
The unfair agent, by contrast, was designed to maximize its own
profit. The agent routinely lies about its own MNS value and
makes high demands of the player. Like the fair agent, this agent
tracks the player’s honesty but it is equally demanding regardless
of how honest the player is.
One final difference between the two agents is how they handle
a player’s final offer. The fair agent has a small chance of accepting
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an offer lower than its fair offer. But it will not accept anything
3 or more points less than the fair offer. When the unfair agent
receives a final offer, it considers how many points it will gain.
This agent has a high probability of accepting a final offer as long
as it will make a profit of at least one point. Thus, the use of the
final offer option is much more effective against this agent.
Results
A linear mixed effects model (Bates et al., 2014; Kuznetsova
et al., 2015) with trial block and agent type as fixed factors and
subject as a random effect was fitted to the data and the fixed
effects parameters were tested for significance with t-tests. For
binomially distributed variables (final offers and agreements), a
generalized linear mixed effects model was fitted instead. Model
estimates, as well as their standard errors and t-values, are
reported in Tables 1–3.
Strategic Adaptation
Overall, there was no significant difference between subjects’
performance against the fair and unfair agents. (Mfair = 12.2
points, SE = 0.6; Munfair = 12.5 points, SE = 0.9). There was
some evidence of strategic adaptation based on the agent. The
participants learned to use the final offer move more often
against the unfair agent (Mfair = 51%, SE = 7%; Munfair = 63%
points, SE = 6%) (Z = 3.114, p < 0.002), and they used the
final offer option more often as the experiment progressed, but
there was no interaction between these two factors, meaning that
this strategic adjustment did not change with practice. Further,
participants exaggerated their MNS values by about the same
amount regardless of the agent (Mfair = 1.17, SE = 0.13; Munfair
= 1.24, SE= 0.11). Finally, there was a numerical trend such that
subjects were more successful in reaching agreements with the
unfair agent than with the fair agent (Mfair = 60%, SE = 4%;
Munfair = 75% points, SE = 3%), but this effect did not reach
significance (Z = 1.07, n.s.).
Learning
Participants in this experiment did not appear to improve with
practice in a meaningful way (see Figure 2). Analyses on lying
and final offers showed no evidence of a strategy shift over the
course of the experiment (there were no significant interactions
between agent type and block). There was a small trend such that
participants scored more points as the experiment progressed,
but this effect did not reach significance [Estimate = 1.05, SE
= 0.61, t(102) = 1.7, p = 0.09]. The numerical magnitude of this
trend was also very small, average performance in block 3 was
only 2 points higher than block one.
TABLE 1 | LME analysis on points earned.
Estimate SE df t p
Block 1.05 0.61 102 1.72 0.09
Agent type −0.02 1.86 102 −0.01 0.99
Block × Agent type 0.12 0.86 102 0.14 0.89
Agent Type was dummy coded (0 = Fair Agent; 1 = Unfair).
To investigate how higher performing participants’ strategies
differed from lower performers, we divided the sample into
quartiles based on overall score. Figures 3–6 display the data by
quartile. Quartiles were defined by a subject’s overall score for the
entire experiment. Overall, dividing the data in this way suggests
that the strategic adaptation we observed is primarily driven
by the top quartile of the sample. Participants in the middle
quartiles performed better against the unfair agent than the fair
agent, and participants in the bottom quartile performed poorly
against both agents (see Figure 3). The top-quartile subjects
have learned that making final offers works better against the
more aggressive unfair agent than against the fair agent (see
Figure 4). Further, subjects in the upper 2 quartiles appear to
also be sensitive to effects of their honesty on the fair agent’s
behavior. These subjects exaggerate their MNS values to a lesser
extent when playing against the fair agent (see Figure 5). These
differences in strategy are reflected in overall scores and rates
of agreement. Participants in the top quartile play well against
the fair and unfair agents. However, participants in the lower
quartiles play noticeably worse against the fair agent. Finally,
participants in the bottom quartile appear to be using an overly
generous cooperative strategy, as evidenced by their high rate of
agreement (see Figure 6) while still receiving a low score.
THE METACOGNITIVE MODEL
We developed a model that can perform the Game of Nines
task in the ACT-R cognitive architecture (Anderson et al., 2004).
This model is capable of identifying the strategy type of the
opponent (cooperative or aggressive) and adjusting its own
behavior accordingly. This model possesses multiple strategies
in its declarative memory. As the negotiation progresses, the
model infers the type of opponent it is playing by comparing
the opponent’s behavior to the behavior predicted by these
strategies. Once it has classified its opponent, the model will
select the strategy it deems most appropriate for the given
opponent.
Declarative Memory in ACT-R
The primary theoretical mechanism driving our agent’s behavior
is ACT-R’s declarative memory system. Previous work shows the
dynamics of this system provide a good explanation of behavior
in strategic games (West et al., 2005; Gonzalez et al., 2014). Our
model contains a set of instances or cases that describe possible
moves and the MNS values and strategies associated with those
moves. The instances are stored as chunks in ACT-R’s declarative
TABLE 2 | Results of LME analysis on exaggeration of MNS values.
Estimate SE df t p
Block 0.02 0.06 1,488 0.35 0.73
Agent type 0.21 0.19 1,488 1.09 0.28
Block × Agent type −0.07 0.09 1,488 −0.83 0.41
This DV is computed by subtracting the player’s actual MNS value from the value they
report to the agent. Agent Type was dummy coded (0 = Fair Agent; 1 = Unfair).
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TABLE 3 | Results of GLME analysis on use of final offers.
Estimate SE Z p
Block 0.25 0.11 2.33 0.02*
Agent type 1.02 0.33 3.11 <0.01**
Block × Agent Type −0.16 0.15 −1.07 0.29
This DV is defined as the proportion of trials on which the participant made a final offer. *,
significant at p <0.05, **, significant at p < 0.01. Agent Type was dummy coded (0 = Fair
Agent; 1 = Unfair).
FIGURE 2 | The percentage of total points available in each block earned by
the participants. There was very little change across the three blocks of the
experiment. Fifty percent represents the ideal outcome: the agent and player
each take half of the possible points. None are wasted due to failures to reach
agreement.
memory. A chunk is a schematic unit of information that has
one or more slots containing values or links to other chunks
in declarative memory. Each chunk also possesses an activation
value. More active chunks are more likely to be retrieved in a
search of declarative memory. The activation level of a chunk (i)
is derived from the following equation:
Ai = Bi + Pi + Logistic (0, s)
In this equation, Bi refers to the base level activation of the
chunk. All chunks had a base level activation of 0.0 that did not
change throughout the experiment. Pi is themismatch penalty for
chunk i (see next paragraph). The rightmost term of the equation
represents noise added to the activation level. Prior research
has shown that this memory noise provides a good theoretical
account of variability in strategic behavior (West et al., 2005).
A chunk does not have to be a perfect match to a retrieval
request in order to be retrieved. When a chunk in declarative
FIGURE 3 | Average number of points scored against each agent by
members of each quartile.
FIGURE 4 | Average probability of using the final offer option as a function of
agent and quartile.
memory is not a perfect match to a retrieval request, then ACT-R
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FIGURE 5 | Difference between claimed and actual MNS values as a function
of quartile and agent type.
FIGURE 6 | Proportion of trials in which an agreement was reached.
P is the mismatch scaling factor. When P is higher, activation is
more strongly affected by mismatching. In this model it is set to
5.M indicates the similarity value between the relevant slot value
in the retrieval request (l) and the corresponding slot chunk i (the
chunk in declarative memory) summed over all slot values in the
retrieval request. For numerical values, the similarity score was






This function ensures that, for any two values, l and i, the
similarity score will be between −1 (most dissimilar) and 0
(least dissimilar or identical). Moreover, the similarity values
between “aggressive” and “cooperative” in the strategy slots were
set at −1, but the similarity between aggressive and neutral and
cooperative and neutral was set to −0.1. Thus, if the system is
searching for a cooperative instance, it is most likely to retrieve a
cooperative instance, and it is more likely to retrieve a neutral
instance than an aggressive instance. Similarities between all
other non-numerical values were set to−1.
Our model uses the same instances to guide its own behavior
and to interpret the behavior of others. Each instance represents
a move and a context in which to make that move. Some of
these instances are characteristic of cooperative players (e.g.,
conceding even when your offer is close to your minimum)
and others are more characteristic of aggressive players (e.g.,
declaring that this is your last offer, even though you still have
room to concede). An initial set of instances was hand-coded
by the authors following the above mentioned guidelines. These
instances were down-selected and adjusted manually in order
to improve the fit of the agent’s predictions to the data from
Experiment 1. The final set of instances can be found in Appendix
A in Supplementary Material. The model contains a total of 30
instances: 12 cooperative, 9 aggressive, and 9 neutral. The model
chooses an action based on its own chosen strategy and context.
Similarly, it decides which strategy its opponent is using based on
its opponent’s action and context.
Selecting an Action
The model retrieves instances based on conditions. These
conditions specify important information about the game, such
as the distance between the model’s current offer and its MNS
value (offer-difference), the opponent’s previous move (did they
concede and by how much?), and the model’s current selected
strategy (see below for details on strategy selection). Once the
conditions have been calculated by the model, ACT-R’s partial
matching mechanism is used to determine which instance is
the best match to the current situation. The model then applies
the move specified by the best matching instance. The possible
moves include initial-offer, concede, insist, final-offer, and quit
(based on the classification system proposed by Filzmoser and
Vetschera, 2008). An initial-offer instance specifies the first offer
the model should make in a given round. Concede tells the model
to reduce its current offer. Insist tells the model to re-submit the
current offer. Final-offer causes the model to indicate that it will
not accept any less than the current offer. Finally, quit simply
instructs the model to quit the round.
The instances are classified into three different strategy types:
Cooperative, Aggressive, and Neutral. Cooperative instances are
modeled after softline bargaining strategies (Esser and Komorita,
1975; Huffmeier et al., 2014). In general, they instruct the
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model to make lower opening offers and to concede frequently,
especially when the model’s current offer is far above the
model’s MNS value and when the opponent offers a concession.
Aggressive instances call for higher opening offers and less
frequent concessions (Siegel and Fouraker, 1960). In addition,
whereas the cooperative instances will always tell the model
to be honest in reporting its MNS value, aggressive instances
instruct themodel to exaggerate itsMNS value. Finally, themodel
will make final offers when using the aggressive strategy, but
will not when using the cooperative strategy. The model also
includes neutral instances. These instances represent behavior
that is ambiguous or appropriate regardless of one’s goal.
Theory of Mind
Themodel uses these same instances to determine the opponent’s
strategy. Every time the opponent makes a move, the model
assumes the perspective of the opponent and attempts to
determine if the move is most similar to the cooperative,
aggressive, or neutral instances. The model searches declarative
memory using the opponent’s move, the model’s previous move,
and an estimate of the opponent’s distance to their MNS value.
If the instance retrieved is cooperative or aggressive, the model
increases its confidence that the opponent is using the retrieved
strategy. If it is neutral, the model ignores the move and keeps
its previous estimate. The model has two additional chunks
in memory, labeled cooperative and aggressive, to track the
opponent’s relative use of each strategy. Each time the model
detects one of the two strategies it reinforces the associated
chunk. To determine which strategy the opponent is using
overall, it retrieves the most active of these two chunks from
memory. This retrieval is governed by the same activation
and noise functions described above. The implication is that
the agent’s belief about the strategic stance of its opponent
will fluctuate based on the recency and frequency of prior
evaluations, as well as system-wide noise in declarative memory.
The frequency effects enable the agent to build up confidence
about the opponent’s strategy while the recency effects allow the
model to adapt to strategy shifts.
To interpret an opponent’s move, the model considers two
primary factors: reciprocity and minimal goals. Reciprocity is the
tendency for the opponent to concede after the model concedes.
High reciprocity is a characteristic of cooperative players (Esser
and Komorita, 1975; Huffmeier et al., 2014). Thus cooperative
instances will tend to respond to concessions with concessions,
but aggressive instances may be more likely to insist. Minimal
goals refer to the smallest payout a player is willing to accept from
a negotiation. This is influenced by their MNS values. Behavior
that appears aggressive could simply be the result of a high
minimal goal on a given round. Although the model does not
know the opponent’s MNS values, it knows that (as the human
players did in the experiment), on average, the opponent’s average
MNS values will be the same as its own. Therefore, the model
stores its past MNS values in declarative memory and uses these
memories to estimate its opponent’s minimal goal in a given
round. Aggressive behaviors are defined as those having a high
value relative to a player’s minimal goal.
Once the model has determined the type of opponent it
is playing against, it must decide how to respond. If the
opponent is a cooperative player, the model will also choose
a cooperative strategy, but if the opponent is aggressive, the
model will choose an aggressive strategy. Once a counter-strategy
is chosen, the model will use it to search for an appropriate
instance in memory. See Table 4 for example instances. The
chosen strategy is used as a retrieval cue when selecting an
instance from memory as described above. Once the model has
chosen a strategy, it is most likely to select instances from that
strategy. Instances belonging to the other strategy types receive
a mismatch penalty according to the formula described above.
The Mli values are set as follows. The aggressive and cooperative
strategies are maximally different from one another (Mli = −1).
However, the neutral strategy is more similar to both strategies
(Mli = −0.1). As a consequence, the model will usually pick
instances from its chosen strategy, but will also sometimes select
instances from the neutral strategy. Because of the highmismatch
penalty, the model will rarely select instances from the opposite
strategy.
SIMULATION RESULTS
Three different versions of the cognitive model were played
against the fair and unfair agents: cooperative, aggressive,
and metacognitive. The cooperative model always used the
cooperative strategy, the aggressive model always used the
aggressive strategy, and the metacognitive model changed
strategies depending on its opponent’s behavior. Just like
TABLE 4 | Example instances.
Slot name Value Interpretation
EXAMPLE 1
My-strategy Cooperative I am using the cooperative strategy.
MNS-Bid Diff 3 My previous bid was three points
higher than my MNS value.
Opponent-move-type Concede My opponent’s previous bid is lower
than the one he made before that.
Opponent-move-value 1 My-opponent’s previous bid is one
point lower than the one before it.
My-move-type Concede I will now submit a lower bid than
my previous bid.
My-move-value 1 My bid will be one point lower than
my previous bid.
EXAMPLE 2
My-strategy Aggressive I am using the aggressive strategy.
MNS-Bid Diff 3 My previous bid was three points
higher than my MNS value.
Opponent-move-type Concede My opponent’s previous bid is lower
than the one he made before that.
Opponent-move-value 1 My-opponent’s previous bid is one
point lower than the one before it.
My-move-type Insist I will now resubmit my current bid.
My-move-value 0 My new bid will be no different than
my current bid.
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the human participants, the cooperative, aggressive, and
metacognitive models played against the fair and unfair agents
for three blocks of 12 trials each. To ensure stable data, we ran
the simulation for 500 simulated subjects.
As mentioned in the behavioral results, we suspected that the
top participants were using theory of mind, while the middle
subjects were using an aggressive strategy. We divided the
subjects into three groups based on hypothesized strategy: the
first group consisted of the top quartile (n = 6), the second
group consisted of the middle two quartiles (n = 10), and
the third group consisted of the bottom quartile (n = 5). We
hypothesized that the first group used theory of mind to adapt to
their opponents. Therefore, we expected themetacognitivemodel
to be the best fit. By contrast, we hypothesized the second group
used an aggressive strategy, and would therefore be best fit by the
aggressive model. The third group was not modeled due to a lack
of clear strategy.
Model Performance
The three cognitive models performed as expected against the
two non-cognitive agents (see Figure 7). The cooperative model
performed very well against the fair agent, because it was
always honest and not very demanding. However, it was heavily
exploited by the unfair agent, resulting in a low score. Conversely,
the aggressive model performed very well against the unfair
agent because it used final offers liberally. It did not however, do
well against the fair agent because it frequently exaggerated its
own MNS, causing the fair agent to retaliate with higher bids.
The performance of the metacognitive model was more robust,
scoring well against both agents. It played just as well as the
aggressive model against the unfair agent, but did not play quite
as well as the cooperative model against the fair agent. This is
most likely due to the fact that the model is uncertain early
on about the cooperativeness of its opponent, and therefore is
sometimes more aggressive than necessary. On some runs, the
model learns that the fair agent is cooperative before it is too late.
However, on other runs early aggression escalates into further
aggression from both sides, rendering cooperation impossible.
Quality of Fit
The metacognitive model provides the best description of the
Q4 subjects (see Figures 8–10). It fits the data best on all three
dependent measures: points, final offers, and agreements. The
model scores very similarly to human subjects, coming within
1 standard error against both agents. It also provides a good
qualitative fit of the usage of final offers, though it slightly
overpredicts the final offer usage against the unfair agent. The
model also replicates the trend that participants reach more
agreements with the unfair agent than with the fair agent. The
aggressive model is a slightly worse fit, and the cooperative model
is a very poor fit to the data. Overall, this suggests that the top
quartile of participants were effective at identifying andmatching
the strategy of the opposing agent.
When the performance of the models is compared to the
middle 50 percent of subjects, it becomes clear that these subjects
are using an aggressive strategy and they are not adapting
strategies to suit the opposing agent. This is indicated by the
FIGURE 7 | Performance of each version of the model against the two
non-cognitive agents.
FIGURE 8 | Comparison of the aggressive and metacognitive models to
human data with respect to negotiation score. The Y-axis represents raw score
per block. Separate lines represent different groups of humans or model types.
fact that the aggressive model provides the best fit for these
subjects. In terms of overall score, the model performs at a
very similar level as the subjects. It also provides a very good
fit for the final offer data and only slightly underpredicts the
rate of agreement when playing against the unfair agent. The
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FIGURE 9 | A comparison of the aggressive and metacognitive models to
human data with respect to final offer usage. Separate lines represent different
groups of humans or model types.
FIGURE 10 | A comparison of the aggressive and metacognitive models to
human data with respect to agreements reached. Separate lines represent
groups of humans or model types.
metacognitive agent did not fit as well, usually because it
overpredicted performance against the fair agent. As with the top
subjects, the cooperative model was very far from the participant
averages.
The subjects in the bottom quartile appear to be using a
weak cooperative strategy. Of the three models, the cooperative
model comes closest to fitting these data with respect to final
offers and agreements. However, the cooperative model scores far
better overall than the bottom subjects. This may be explained
by the fact that the bottom subjects were more likely than the
other groups to accept the agent’s offer (rather than continuing
to negotiate until the agent settled). On average, the bottom
subjects accepted 6.6 offers throughout the experiment, while all
other quartiles combined accepted an average of 0.6 offers. They
were also more likely than the other groups to quit a negotiation
round (MQ1 = 5; MQ2−Q4 = 2.03). This suggests these subjects
were playing an “impatient cooperative” strategy, in which they
quickly gave in to an opponent’s demands or ended the round.
DISCUSSION
These results suggest that adapting to the strategy of even
a simple software agent can be difficult for naïve subjects.
In this experiment, participants were required to recognize
when an agent was behaving cooperatively or aggressively and
counter with the appropriate strategy. However, the majority of
subjects failed to do this, instead adopting an aggressive strategy
regardless of the agent. These subjects failed to recognize that
they should play tough against the unfair agent and soft against
the fair agent.
Fitting the data in this experiment is a good initial test of
the model, but it is known that people negotiate differently with
artificial agents than they do with people. In order to confirm
that our model is a reasonable, realistic negotiation partner, we
needed to know if the model could perform well against humans.
This was the object of Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 showed that the metacognitive model provides
a good description of how people negotiate against artificial
agents. However, it was still not clear whether the model can
perform realistically against humans. In Experiment 2, we pitted
the metacognitive model against human opponents in a scenario
similar to a Turing test. This experiment aimed to answer
three questions. First, can the model successfully negotiate with
human opponents? Second, does the model play against humans
similarly to the way humans play against each other? Third, is the
model a believable opponent?
Method
Participants
Thirty-eight people participated in the experiment in exchange
for a monetary payment of 10 euros. This group consisted mainly
of international students at the University of Groningen. The age
and gender distribution of this group was similar to that of the
participants of Experiments 1 and 3. All were recruited using ads
posted on social media.
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Design
Participants were divided into two groups: human vs. human (n
= 20, i.e., 10 dyads) and human vs. model (14 dyads). In the
human vs. human condition, participants played the Game of
Nines against each other through a chat window interface. In the
human vs. model condition, participants played the game against
a paid confederate operating the model. The purpose of the
confederate was to create the appearance that a human opponent
was present and to give the model more realistic response times.
Procedure
The experimenter briefed both participants on the rules of the
game. One participant was then led to a nearby cubicle. Their
counterpart was led to a sound-proof room. The participant was
told that their counterpart would either be choosing their own
moves or operating a computational model. They were instructed
that they should select their actions with the goal to get as
many points as possible for themselves, not to try to figure out
whether the opponent was a human or model. As in the previous
experiment, subjects knew that, on average, MNS values for both
parties would be the same.
The experimenter sat in a third room and communicated
with the participants via the chat window interface. At the
beginning of each round, the experimenter privately sent each
participant his/her MNS value for the round. In addition, the
experimenter told the participants which player should make the
first offer. Players alternated making the first offer with every
round. Fourteen total trials were played, using the followingMNS
values in random order (1,1) (2,2) (3,3) (4,4) (1,3) (3,1) (1,5) (5,1)
(3,4) (4,3) (2,6) (6,2) (4,5) (5,4).
Because the model is not designed to generate text or speech
(other than a few basic statements), all participants were given
a fixed set of statements from which they could select. These
included stating a specific offer, declaring a final offer, accepting
an opponent’s offer, and quitting the round. Participants were
asked to always use the same wording when using these moves
(e.g., to accept an offer, a player would always type “deal”).
Finally, when all rounds of the negotiation were complete,
the participant in the cubicle was given a questionnaire and
asked to answer several questions about the counterpart. These
included questions about the counterpart’s agreeability, likability,
and humanity. All questions were answered using a 10-point
Likert scale.
The Model
Pilot testing indicated that a few participants could exploit
the model, putting it into a cooperative state when it should
have been aggressive. One possible reason for this is that the
final offer policy of both cooperative and aggressive strategies
was too lenient. Thus, after pilot testing, the instances used
in the metacognitive agent were modified (see Appendix A in
Supplementary Material). Specifically, the model was given the
ability to quit a trial if it appeared that the final agreement was not
going to be worthwhile. The model would quit if the value of the
model’s current offer was too low. Furthermore, the model quits
sooner while in the aggressive state than it does in the cooperative
state.
Confederates interacted with the model through a GUI. Using
the GUI, confederates could input the offer made by the other
player and whether it was a final offer. In turn, the agent indicated
the move that the confederate should make to the participant.
Results
Three dyads in the human vs. model condition were excluded
because the human confederate made errors when operating the
model. This resulted in 11 human vs. model dyads and 10 human
vs. human dyads remaining in the final dataset.
Three major results emerge from this experiment. First, the
model was able to successfully negotiate with human partners,
achieving more points from the negotiation than its partners
(although human-model dyads reached fewer agreements than
human-human dyads). Second, the model achieved similar levels
of performance in terms of trials quit and final offers made.
Finally, the model achieved a degree of believability, as humanity
ratings did not differ between the human players and the
confederates operating the model.
In terms of overall score, the model performed just as well
as the human counterparts (see Table 5). However, it played
a bit more aggressively than humans do. Examining the other
dependent variables suggests that the model otherwise plays
similarly to humans. The model’s use of final offers and quits is
not significantly different from those of the human players (p >
0.1), but there is a trend such that the model quits more often
and uses final offers more often than human players do. As a
result, the model’s partners scored lower on average than those
who played against humans [t(16.778) = −3.70, p < 0.002]. In
addition, the model chose to use a cooperative strategy on only
32% (SE = 8%) of the trials. This means that on the majority of
trials, the model believed the player was acting aggressively and
responded accordingly.
The results of the humanity survey were encouraging. On
average, players gave the model a humanity rating of 5.82 and
gave the human players a rating of 5.6 (|t| < 1). This result
suggests that, over the course of our short negotiation game, the
model’s behavior was plausible to participants.
Discussion
Experiment 2 is a successful test case for the metacognitive
model. Our results indicate that the model performs just as
well against human players as humans do. Further, its play
style is similar to humans with the exception that it is slightly
more aggressive. Finally, the model was able to pass our simple
Turing Test, achieving similar humanity ratings as real human
participants.
It should be noted, however, that the model does not appear
to be a perfect fit. It seems that the model plays more aggressively
overall than humans do. The model quit more often and used
final offers more often than the human vs. human players did.
It also seems to have caused similar behavior in its partners.
Most importantly, the model allowed its partners to have far
fewer points than the human players did. The model chose the
cooperative strategy on only 33% of all steps. It is not the case
that the model simply played aggressively against the players
regardless of the players’ behavior. The better performing subjects
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TABLE 5 | Comparison of model performance to human performance in Experiment 2.
Player 1 Participant score Human/model partner Player 1 final offers Partner final offers Player 1 quits Partner quits
Model 9.7 (2.8)** 13.9 (3.4) 5.7 (2.5) 5.1 (2.2) 4.3 (1.9) 4.5 (1.9)
Human 15.3 (3.7) 13.8 (4.1) 4.4 (1.5) 4.4 (1.5) 3 (1.3) 3 (1)
Values in parentheses are standard deviations. Each round contained 14 trials, making the maximum number of quits and final offers 14. “Counterpart” refers to the human participant
playing the game from outside the sound proof chamber. **Model performance is significantly different from human performance at p < 0.01.
were better able to encourage the model to cooperate. Against the
top five scoring subjects, themodel chose the cooperative strategy
42% of the time.
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 2 showed that our metacognitive model negotiates
effectively and believably against human players. In Experiment
3, we aimed to determine whether practicing with our
metacognitive model could improve theory of mind skills. This
time, participants interacted directly with the model (without
a human intermediary). We hypothesized that playing against
an adaptive agent would better help participants learn theory of
mind than the simple agents of Experiment 1.
Effective use of theory of mind requires that participants
notice that the model has beliefs about their behavior and
adjusts its own behavior accordingly. This may be difficult for
participants to recognize in a complex task like negotiation.
More difficult still is understanding what these beliefs are and
how they can manipulate these beliefs. Therefore, to facilitate
learning, we included a condition in which participants received
explicit feedback about the model’s beliefs. After every bid,
these participants were notified whether the model believed their
behavior was cooperative or aggressive and whether the model
was playing cooperatively or aggressively.
Participants
43 people (13 males, age M = 21.52, SD = 2.07) participated in
the experiment in exchange for 10 euros. This group consisted
mainly of international students at the University of Groningen.
All were recruited using ads posted on social media.
Design and Procedure
The experiment consisted of two phases: a training phase and
a test phase. In the training phase, participants were assigned
to either the feedback condition or the no-feedback condition.
Participants in the feedback condition received information
about the model’s beliefs (described in greater detail in the
Cognitive Agent section). In the test phase, all participants
received no feedback.
In both the training phase and the test phase, the participants
played the Game of Nines against the metacognitive agent for
3 blocks of 12 trials. As before, a trial consisted of each player
being assigned an MNS value and negotiating until agreement or
quitting. The following pairs of MNS values were used: (1,1) (2,2)
(3,3) (4,4) (1,3) (3,1) (1,5) (5,1) (2,6) (6,2) (4,5) (5,4). Each pair
was used once per block in random order.
Metacognitive Agent
The metacognitive agent contained the same instances (and
therefore behaved the same way) as the agent in Experiment 2.
Participants interacted with the agent using a graphical interface.
Like the interface for the non-cognitive agents, this interface
contained buttons for the player to indicate their bid and to
declare a final offer. Moreover, the player could choose to accept
the agent’s offer or quit the round on any turn. At the end of a
round, the player was asked to press the “Next Round” button to
begin a new round. Regardless of feedback condition, all players
could see the number of points they had earned in a given block.
However, the players received no information about the model’s
score.
Theory of Mind Feedback
Participants in the feedback condition received information
about the model’s current strategy and the model’s evaluation
of the player’s last move. If the model was using a cooperative
strategy, a smiley face was shown in the graphical interface. But if
the model was using an aggressive strategy, a frowning face was
displayed instead. In addition, the model displayed a message
to the player showing whether the model thought the player’s
move was cooperative, aggressive or neutral. In the no-feedback
condition, no face appeared in the interface and no evaluation
messages were displayed. See Figure 11 for a screenshot of the
display.
Results
Two participants received a negative total score for the
experiment, indicating that they either ignored or failed to
understand the instruction to not accept any deals of negative
value. Therefore, these two participants were removed from all
analyses. In all of the following analyses, we used Linear Mixed
Effects (LME) models (Bates et al., 2014; Kuznetsova et al., 2015)
with subjects as a random effect.
First, we analyzed the participants’ performance data as a
function of phase and feedback group. The main effects of
both variables as well as their interaction term were entered
into the model. Participants had significantly higher scores in
the second phase than in the first phase regardless of feedback
condition [t(39) = 2.305, p = 0.0266]. There was a numerical
trend such that participants in the feedback condition performed
better overall (M = 35.9% points earned) than those in the no-
feedback condition (M= 35.1%) and participants in the feedback
condition appear to have improved more from phase 1 to phase
2 than those in the no-feedback group (see Figure 12). However,
neither of these trends was statistically significant (p > 0.1).
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FIGURE 11 | A screenshot from the model in the feedback condition. In the no-feedback condition, no face was shown on the left side and statements evaluating the
player’s move (e.g., “That is a cooperative bid.”) did not appear.
The initial analysis supported our hypothesis that training
with the metacognitive agent would yield measurable
improvements in negotiation scores. However, it did not
support our hypothesis that providing theory of mind feedback
would enhance these gains (see Table 6 and Figure 12). Yet,
visual inspection of the individual performance curves suggested
that subjects who performed better in the training phase showed
stronger improvements in the test phase. To investigate this
possibility, we performed a median split based on subject
performance in the training phase. Participants who scored
below the median were placed into the low-median group
and those above the median were in the high-median group.
We then submitted these data to a LME model with feedback
group, phase, and median (as well as their interactions) as fixed
effects and subjects as a random effect. This analysis revealed a
three-way interaction between feedback, phase and median (see
Table 7 and Figure 13). Those in the low-performance group
showed roughly the same amount of improvement in the test
phase, regardless of feedback. However, those in the high-median
group showed improvement only when receiving feedback.
In order to examine differences in learning rates between
experiments, we analyzed data from the training phase alone.
The training phase contained the same number of trials as
Experiment 1. To determine if detectable learning occurred in
TABLE 6 | LME results by feedback group and by experiment phase.
Fixed factor
(reference group)
Estimate SE df t p
Feedback group
(no feedback)
−0.519 2.639 55.9 0.197 0.845
Phase (1) 3.750 1.627 39 2.305 0.0266
Phase × group 2.726 2.273 39 1.199 0.237
the training phase of the experiment, we fit a linear mixed-effects
model to the three blocks of the training phase (Table 8).
This analysis indicates significant improvement in terms of
negotiation outcomes after the same amount of practice as
in Experiment 1 (whereas no significant effect emerged in
Experiment 1). Though preliminary, this result suggests a benefit
to training with cognitive agents as opposed to non-cognitive
agents.
Discussion
Two important results emerge from Experiment 3. First, students
training against our metacognitive agent showed significant
improvement in negotiation scores whereas the students that
played against the fixed-strategy agents in Experiment 1 did
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FIGURE 12 | Percentage of points earned by the player as a function of group
and experiment phase. Fifty percent represents an even split between the
human player and the model.
TABLE 7 | LME results after splitting data into high and low performance groups.
Fixed factor
(reference group)
Estimate SE df t p
Feedback group
(no feedback)
0.027 2.82 61.52 0.01 0.992
Phase (1) 8.0 2.14 37 3.376 <0.001
Median (low) 12.4 2.88 61.52 4.293 <0.001
Group × Phase −2.09 2.96 37 0.707 0.484
Group × Median −0.527 4.04 61.5 0.131 0.897
Phase × Median −8.5 3.03 37 2.807 0.00793
Group × Phase ×
Median
9.69 4.23 37 2.289 0.0278
not. This suggests that playing against an agent with theory of
mind may be more helpful than playing against one without, at
least for relatively short training periods. The second key finding
is that additional feedback about the model’s metacognitive
state helped only participants who were already performing
well. Low performers benefited just as much with or without
feedback. This suggests that acquiring theory of mind is
cognitively demanding, and students cannot make use of the
feedback if they are still mastering other, more basic elements
of the task (e.g., how and when to make bids, basic tactics,
operating the interface, etc.). We suspect that both of the low
performing groups were learning basic aspects of the task and
the low-performing feedback group likely either ignored the
theory of mind feedback or did not know how to make use
of it.
FIGURE 13 | Percentage of points earned after dividing participants into high
and low performance groups.
TABLE 8 | LME analysis on points earned in the training phase of Experiment 3.
Estimate SE df t p
Block 1.93 0.46 80 4.143 <0.05*
Feedback group (no feedback) 0.61 1.56 119 4.14 0.70
Block × Feedback group 0.22 0.64 80 0.34 0.73
*Means statistically significant at α = 0.05.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Training in interpersonal skills like negotiation can be expensive
and time-consuming. Training with artificial agents can help
by providing a consistent training experience that does not
require a coach or a training partner. Cognitive architectures,
like ACT-R, can help to produce artificial agents that behave
more similarly to humans than traditional approaches. Here we
present an example artificial agent based on a cognitive model
built in ACT-R. Experiment 1 showed that this agent replicates
common strategies used by human participants. Experiment 2
showed that this agent can interact with humans in a believable
way and that human-agent dyads can perform almost as well
as human-human dyads. Finally, Experiment 3 showed that
participants can improve their performance in the Game of Nines
by practicing with the agent. Overall, cognitive architectures may
be valuable assets in the creation of artificial training partners for
interpersonal skills.
We believe that training with metacognitive agents is
potentially a useful training technique. Training with an artificial
agent has been shown to be effective in improving negotiation
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skill (Lin et al., 2014; de Weerd et al., 2015a). A cognitive
agent could demonstrate human-like cooperative and aggressive
strategies, training the student to better recognize the two.
Additionally, practicing against a cognitive agent could allow a
participant to try out cooperative and aggressive strategies, and
thus better learn when to use them. More generally speaking, we
believe cognitive agents have great potential as training partners
in a variety of domains.
There are many existing artificial agents that allow people
to practice negotiation (Carneiro et al., 2012; Lin et al.,
2014; Cao et al., 2015). However, an important feature of
our agent for education is cognitive plausibility. Human
behavior often deviates from normative rationality, so training
with an agent that exhibits realistic biases and cognitive
limitation can provide exposure to situations during training
that would not occur with a normative agent (e.g., mis-
remembering prior interactions, hasty generalizations). It
remains an open question which types of cognitive and
behavioral phenomena are most important to include in training.
However, answering this question could improve training
outcomes by maximizing focus on those situations a student is
most likely to see.
Our model is built on the assumption that people use
theory-of-mind (at least to a degree) when engaging in social
interactions and games. Existing cognitive models of trust
have been effective in modeling performance in coordination
games (e.g., the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken: Juvina
et al., 2014; Collins et al., 2015). These models assume
that trust develops according to a utility function. When
cooperation is rewarded, the model will trust the opponent
more. However, a utility-learning approach may be difficult to
employ in situations where the payoff is delayed or uncertain.
In our model, the development of trust occurs primarily
in declarative memory. People compare their counterpart’s
behavior to examples of cooperative and aggressive behavior
they have encountered in the past. Using this process,
they can determine whether the person is cooperative or
aggressive. It is possible that the development of trust in real-
world settings involves a combination of these two types of
processes.
The present work only scratches the surface of the
complexities and nuances of theory-of-mind reasoning. The
present model attempts to infer only its counterpart’s strategic
stance. However, theory of mind also includes a variety of
complex reasoning processes, including reasoning about a
counterpart’s beliefs and about a counterpart’s beliefs about the
agent’s beliefs (de Weerd et al., 2015b).
The agent may also provide insights into why theory of
mind sometimes fails. In negotiation, people usually do not
have access to specific information about the circumstances of
their counterpart. In the present experiments, the model did
not have access to the opponent’s current MNS value, so it
substituted a noisy average based on its own past MNS values.
This sometimes led to errors (e.g., believing an opponent’s MNS
was 2 when it was really 4). In real world negotiations, people
may have very little information about their counterparts’ reserve
prices, potentially leading firmness to be misconstrued as greed
(and vice versa). Thus, our approach may potentially be useful
when searching for circumstances that may lead to mistrust and
misunderstandings.
Our model provides an account of how people use instance-
based reasoning to infer the intentions of others. However, it
remains an open question how people acquire new instances and
how they classify those instances as cooperative or aggressive.
One way people may do this is by comparing newly observed
instances to stored instances and rating their overall similarity
to cooperative and aggressive instances. Alternatively, people
may associate instances with particular people. They may then
evaluate the strategies of new people by comparing them to
people they have observed in the past.
To ensure that the behavior of the model was plausible,
its instances were written by the authors, not by a learning
algorithm. The assumption here is that this set of instances
represents one possible learning history that could produce
the observed behavior. There are many different possible sets
of instances that could be used for such a model, but these
different sets would potentially result in different patterns
of behavior than that of the present model. Most other
possible sets of instances are likely to produce erratic or
ineffective behavior in our task, but we acknowledge that other
sets of instances exist that may produce plausible behavior.
Nevertheless, the use of instances to infer the mental state of
the opponent proved to be an effective strategy for producing
a model that performs well and is believable to human
players.
An important type of negotiation not addressed by the current
model is integrative negotiation. Integrative negotiation refers
to the process through which negotiators work together to find
opportunities to improve joint value. By contrast, distributive
negotiation refers to the process of deciding how to divide the
available value among the negotiators. In other words, integrative
negotiation concerns how to “grow the pie,” and distributive
negotiation concerns how to “divide the pie” (Kersten, 2001).
In the Game of Nines, the only integrative component is the
fact that if players fail to reach an agreement, they both lose an
opportunity to gain points. In real-world negotiations, integrative
negotiation involves exchanging information about preferences
(Bartos, 1995; Kersten, 2001). We believe our agent will still be
helpful for students in these negotiations because the central
skill trained by our agent, theory of mind, is also important
(perhaps even more so) in integrative negotiation (Hindriks and
Tykhonov, 2008; de Weerd et al., 2013). It is possible that the
benefits of training negotiation in this simple scenario could
transfer to more complicated scenarios, but additional research
is necessary to confirm this.
CONCLUSION
In negotiations, the behavior of one’s counterpart is often
ambiguous. Successful negotiators must infer the intentions of
their opponents and adjust their own behavior accordingly.
Misinterpreting and failing to reciprocate a cooperative gesture
could turn an otherwise cooperative opponent into an aggressive
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one. However, cooperating with an aggressive opponent may
result in exploitation. Our model provides an example of how
artificial teammates could be built to train people to adapt to
different strategy types in social tasks.
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